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COMMENT 
WHEN CHILDREN SUFFER: 
THE FAILURE OF U.S. 
IMMIGRATION LAW TO PROVIDE 
PRACTICAL PROTECTION FOR 
PERSECUTED CHILDREN 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year, mothers around the world face a devastating 
choice. They can either stay in their home countries, where 
their daughters are at risk of being subjected to female genital 
mutilation (FGM), or they can flee to the United States, where 
their children would potentially be eligible for asylum relief. 
However, under existing U.s. immigration law, even if a child 
is granted asylum, the immigration court will likely not 
recognize an independent asylum claim for the mother. The 
mother will then be ordered removed from the United States 
and must face yet another devastating choice: either leave her 
child behind in the U.S. or take her child back to her home 
country, where persecution and permanent physical 
disfigurement may await her. 
Parents of minor children eligible for asylum face this 
devastating situation, particularly in FGM cases. 1 The United 
1 Although this Comment focuses on cases dealing with FGM, the purpose of 
this work is not to argue for legislative change solely in the context of FGM cases but 
rather for change as to derivative eligibility of parents of both asylee children and U.S. 
citizen children who fear persecution if relocated to their parents' home countries. 
"Female genital mutilation, or FGM, is the collective name given to a series of surgical 
operations, involving the removal of some or all of the external genitalia, performed on 
girls and women primarily in Africa and Asia. Often performed under unsanitary 
263 
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States Department of Justice recognizes that human-rights 
violations against children can take a number of forms, 
including abusive child labor practices, human-trafficking, 
rape, forced prostitution, and forcible military recruitmene In 
such cases, the parents may be ineligible for relief because they 
cannot independently establish a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 3 Parents are faced with this extremely difficult 
decision because U.S. immigration law does not allow for 
derivative asylum claims for parents of minor children. 4 
conditions with highly rudimentary instruments, female genital mutilation is 
'extremely painful,' 'permanently disfigures the female genitalia, land] exposes the girl 
or woman to the risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications,' including 
'bleeding, infection, urine retention, stress, shock, psychological trauma, and damage to 
the urethra and anus.'" Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 361 (BIA 1996)). 
2 U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims (Dec. 10, 1998), available at 
http://www.asy lumlaw .0rgJdocslunited_states/guidelineslchildren. pdf. 
3 Under U.S. immigration law, asylum may be granted to a non-citizen who 
meets the statutory defmition of a refugee and is physically within the United States. 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2009). The definition of "refugee" provided by the 
Immigration and Nationality Act is: 
Id 
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such 
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable and unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion .... 
The only difference between a refugee and an asylee is that a refugee is in 
another country seeking refuge and an asylum seeker has already arrived in 
the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(1) (West 2009). An alien can also 
apply for withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(2) (West 2009). 
Withholding of removal is a narrower remedy that prohibits forcible return of 
the alien to the country of persecution but not to third countries. An 
application for asylum under § 1158 is automatically treated as an 
application for withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(2) in the event relief 
under § 1158 is denied. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (West 2009). 
• 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (West 2009) ("In general ... la] spouse or child ... 
of an alien who is granted asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible 
for asylum under this section, be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, 
or following to join, such alien."); see also Kimberly Sowders Blizzard, A Parent's 
Predicament: Theories of Relief for Deportable Parents of Children ~o Face Female 
Genital Mutilation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 900 (2006) (noting the difficult choice a 
parent faces when his/her daughter would be exposed to FGM in the parents' home 
country because United States courts either refuse to or cannot find legal authority to 
allow the parents to remain in the United States); Alida Yvonne Lasker, Solomon's 
Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 
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Children frequently face de facto deportation when their 
parents do not have a legal right to remain in the United 
States.5 De facto deportation occurs when a child is not legally 
deemed deportable but, realistically, the child has no choice but 
to leave the United States along with her parene The child is 
likely to return to the parent's home country because of a lack 
of family ties and support in the United States.7 De facto 
deportation often arises in two situations. The first situation is 
the case of an asylee childs for whom a grant of asylum may 
represent an empty promise of protection if the family would 
have to, or likely choose to, take the child to the home country 
in order to keep the family intact. 9 The second situation is the 
case of a U.s. citizen or legal permanent resident (LPR) child 
who, despite having a legal right to remain in the United 
States, would nevertheless be subject to de facto deportation to 
a country where the child would likely suffer persecution. 10 
Current asylum law fails to put proper emphasis on 
protecting the child. The ''best interest of the child" principle 
was specifically addressed in a memorandum from the legacy 
INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service), now known as 
231 (2006). 
5 The term "de facto" refers to something that is actual and existing in fact. De 
facto deportation of a child would occur should a parent not be granted asylum relief as 
the child would certainly return with her parent to their home country as the parent 
would be unable to legally remain in the United States. Although the child is not 
formally or legally being deported, the reality of the situation is that she too would 
leave the country with her parent. 
6 The reference to "her" in this sentence should be understood to mean both his 
and her. Throughout this Comment, references to individuals will be in the feminine 
form in order to maintain readability and uniformity. In no way does a reference in the 
feminine form mean to exclude its applicability to males as well. 
7 See In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (BIA Nov. 23, 2001) ("[Nlormally a mother 
would not be expected to leave her child in the United States in order to avoid 
persecution."). 
8 This Comment refers to both "refugees" and "asylees." Although the terms are 
used interchangeably to mean children who suffered past persecution or have a well-
founded fear of future persecution, it is important to understand the distinction. An 
"asylee" is an individual who is inside the U.S. and claiming asylum relief. A "refugee" 
is a person who is outside the U.S. and requesting asylum in the U.S. See DEBORAH E. 
ANKER, LAw OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., Refugee Law 
Center 1999). 
9 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004) (dealing with alien 
children). 
10 See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (dealing with U.S. citizen 
children); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004) (dealing with U.S. citizen 
children). 
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the Department of Homeland Security, which recognized the 
increasing attention from the international community toward 
children asylum seekers. ll Given the legacy INS's stance on 
protecting the best interest of the child, the current practice in 
the United States runs counter to national and international 
concerns about providing relief for parents of asylee children. 
In addition, while the child would be subject to potential 
persecution should she return to her home country with a 
parent, should she remain in the United States she would 
instead be torn from her family. Such separation of parent and 
child runs contrary to the "time-honored policy of family unity 
in U.S. law.,,12 
This Comment focuses on the need for statutory change in 
order to address the policy concerns of family unity and to 
protect asylee children. Part I looks at how the current state of 
immigration law stands in relation to derivative asylum claims. 
Part II examines how courts have interpreted current asylum 
law and the inconsistency and shortcomings of such judicial 
interpretations. Part III examines policy concerns associated 
with the child-parent derivative asylum issue, specifically 
family unity and practical child protection. Finally, Part IV 
makes two recommendations: 1) legislative change to current 
asylum law to allow derivative relief for parents of asylee 
children, and 2) a request for affirmative guidance from the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) on asylum eligibility 
standards for parents of U.S. citizen and LPR children who fear 
persecution in their parents' home country. 
11 u.s. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims (Dec. 10, 1998), available at 
http://www.asylumlaw.orgJdocslunited_states/guidelineslchildren.pdf (stating that the 
internationally recognized "best interests of the child" principle is a useful measure for 
determining appropriate procedures when dealing with children, even though it does 
not playa role in determining substantive eligibility under the U.S. refugee definition. 
The principle rests on the idea that children's rights are human rights and universal 
rights and focuses on the vulnerability of children and the need for refugee policies to 
protect and assist them). 
12 Marcelle Rice, Protecting Parents: Why Mothers and Fathers Who Oppose 
Female Genital Cutting QualifY for Asylum, Immigration Briefings (Nov. 2004). 
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I. DERIVATIVE ASYLUM: ELIGIBILITY UNDER EXISTING U.S. 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Section 208 of the Immigration Nationality Act (INA)13 
provides that, once an individual is granted asylum/4 
derivative claims can be asserted by the primary applicant's 
spouse and/or minor child, whether or not the spouse or child 
independently meets the requirements for asylum.1s However, 
the statute is silent in regard to parents. 16 This poses an 
exceptional problem for asylum seekers when the principal 
asylum applicant is a child. 
Since parents of children granted asylum are not granted 
derivative eligibility under the INA,17 they must look to other 
avenues of relief in order to remain legally in the United 
States. However, there are few alternatives available. In order 
to establish an independent claim for asylum relief, a parent 
must show that she meets the definition of refugee pursuant to 
§ 1l01(a)(42).IB The parent must prove either actual 
persecution or a "well-founded fear of persecution" by the 
government of the home country or a group the government 
13 The INA, the governing statute for United States immigration law, was 
enacted in 1952. Before the INA, a variety of statutes governed immigration law; 
however, they lacked effective organization. The refugee and asylum provisions were 
added by the Refugee Act of 1980. The INA is currently codified at 8 u.s.c. §1101 et 
seq. 
14 The INA states that any alien who is physically present in the United States 
or who arrives in the United States may apply for asylum in accordance with INA § 
208. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (West 2009). A person seeking asylum must have a "well-
founded fear" that he or she will suffer persecution on account of "race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." In reAcosta, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 213 (1985) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A». 
15 "A spouse or child (as defmed in [INA] § 101(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), or (E» of an 
alien who is granted asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible for 
asylum under this section, be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or 
following to join, such alien." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3) (West 2009). 
16 For immigration purposes, "child" is defined as an unmarried person under 
twenty-one years of age who is a child born in wedlock, a stepchild, legitimized, born 
out of wedlock, adopted, or classified as an immediate relative under 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1151(b). 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(1) (West 2009). 
17 The statute specifically provides derivative claims for spouses and children of 
the principal applicant, but it makes no mention of parents of principal applicants, 
even when the principal applicant is a minor child. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3) (West 
2009). 
18 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42) (West 2009). Those applying for asylum have to do so 
within one year of arriving in the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(C) (West 
2009). 
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cannot or will not control making the parent unable or 
unwilling to "avail himself or herself of the persecution.,,19 The 
persecution or well-founded fear of persecution must be based 
on one of the following five categories: race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion. 20 
Although one may be able to establish past persecution, or 
a well-founded fear of future persecution, it is generally 
difficult to establish a nexus between the persecution and one 
ofthe five protected categories.21 This is especially true when it 
is a parent basing an asylum claim on a child's fear of 
persecution.22 A few courts of appeals have shaped the 
definition of membership in a particular social group to provide 
relief to parents and protection to children.23 However, these 
holdings are limited and not consistent among the circuits, 
thus not providing adequate protection to all children. 24 
Furthermore, outside the asylum context, three categories 
exist for granting legal immigrant status: family relationship,26 
19 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2009). 
20 Id. 
21 See Center for Gender and Refugees Studies, CGRS Advice - Female Genital 
Cutting Asylum Cases (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://cgrs. uchastings.eduldocumentslcgrsl advisorieslFGC_cases_ CG RS_overview _advi 
ce.pdf. 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Abay v. 
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004). 
24 Id 
25 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2009). Parents of children who qualify for asylum 
relief, but who do not themselves independently qualify for asylum relief, are faced 
with further disappointment as they are unlikely to gain relief under a "family 
sponsored imInigrant" category. There are four preference categories for family 
sponsored imInigrants: unmarried sons and daughters of citizens, spouses and 
unmarried sons and unmarried sons and unmarried daughters of permanent resident 
aliens, married sons and married daughters of permanent resident aliens, and brothers 
and sisters of citizens. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West 2009). In addition, spouses and 
Ininor children of U.S. citizens are "immediate relatives" outside the preference system. 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b)(E)(2)(A)(i) (West 2009). Parents of a U.S. citizen may also be 
immediate relatives entitled to be petitioned by their son or daughter, but only after 
the U.S. citizen child reaches the age of twenty-one. An individual granted asylum 
whose adInission has not been terminated and who has been physically present in the 
United States for at least one year may apply to adjust his or her status to that of an 
LPR. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1159(a) (West 2009). Upon maintaining five years of LPR status, 
the individual is then entitled to apply for naturalization in order to gain U.S. 
citizenship. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427(a) (West 2009). 
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employment-based, and diversity immigrant status.26 As to 
family relationship, there are four family preference categories, 
none of which allows a child, defined as an unmarried person 
under twenty-one years of age,27 to petition for a parent.28 Since 
it is unrealistic for a minor child to remain unaccompanied in 
the United States, a child asylee whose parents do not qualify 
for asylum or other immigration benefits almost certainly ends 
up leaving the United States with her parents and returning to 
their home country, where they face persecution.29 
II. DEALING WITH THE SHORTCOMINGS: CONFLICTING COURT 
OF APPEALS APPROACHES TO PARENTAL AsYLUM 
ELIGIBILITY 
Since the INA does not expressly provide any relief for 
parents of asylee children, the BIA and the courts of appeals 
have developed various interpretations to afford relief 30 and 
26 Both employment-based and diversity immigrant status categories are 
complex processes that are often beyond the reach of parents of asylee children and are 
beyond the scope ofthis Comment. 
27 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b) (West 2009). 
28 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West 2009). A United States citizen under the age of 
twenty-one cannot confer legal status on his or her parents, nor can a LPR of any age. 
In addition, should the child become a U.S. citizen after five years of LPR status, the 
child would have to wait until they reached the age of twenty-one in order to petition 
for the parents to be granted the legal right to relocate to the United States as 
immediate relatives. Thus, even if a child is able to petition for a parent under one of 
the family-sponsored immigrant preference categories, she would still face being 
separated from her parent for up to six years, plus the time it takes to reach the age of 
twenty-one, as the child would need to gain LPR status and subsequently U.S. 
citi2enship in order to petition for a family relative. The more tender-aged and 
vulnerable the asylee child, the longer she must wait to be joined with her parents. 
See generally Andres v. Holder, 312 F. App'x 905, 2009 WL 430437 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(addressing the issue of children of tender years but in the context of when a child 
witnesses a parent's persecution); Hernandez-Andres v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042 (9th 
Cir.2007). 
29 Alida Yvonne Lasker, Solomon's Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative 
Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK. J. lNT'L. L. 231, 253 (2006). 
30 Congress's enactment of the megal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (§ 601(a» provided an addition to the term "refugee" for 
immigration purposes. The Act added a sentence to the end of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42) 
that reads as follows: 
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced 
to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been 
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other 
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have 
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well 
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looked to alternative legal strategies31 in order to protect 
children. Unfortunately, this piecemeal system has resulted in 
contradictory approaches among the circuits as to a parent's 
asylum eligibility in such circumstances. 32 Circuits are in 
conflict over whether a child's fear of persecution can establish 
eligibility for a parent's asylum claim. This is particularly true 
in cases dealing with FGM; as the practice is directed mainly at 
children, parents are unable to claim direct persecution. 33 
Courts of appeals are bound by long-standing U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent to defer to a reasonable BIA administrative 
interpretation of the INA statute.34 But the BIA, as well as 
immigration courts, fails to provide concrete guidance 
regarding whether a parent qualifies for asylum relief when 
her child would be subjected to persecution were they to return 
to their home country.3S The BIA has not yet directly addressed 
the parent-child derivative issue. In fact, in Benyamin v. 
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject 
to persecution for such failure, refUsal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a 
well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42) (West 2009) (emphasis added). 
The BIA then interpreted this new language to apply to spouses of 
individuals who have been forced to abort pregnancy or undergo involuntary 
sterilization or who have been or fear they will be persecuted for failure to 
undergo abortion or sterilization procedures, if the spouse can show eligibility 
based on her experience or fears. See In re J-S, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 542 (BIA 
2008) (overruling the decisions in In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997); 
In re S-L-L, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 2006) (rejecting the per-se joint spousal, 
eligibility rule, and finding that a spouse of an individual who suffered or will 
suffer abortion or sterilization can qualify for asylum based on her fears and 
experiences with coercive family-planning policies). 
31 See Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that the applicant established an asylum claim based on the harm suffered by her 
disabled child by inventing the doctrine of "persecution renvoi," which establishes that 
a parent may file as the principal applicant and use the harms suffered by the child to 
support the parent's claim). 
32 Compare Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding mother 
eligible for asylum), with In re A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 277 (BIA 2007) (holding 
mother ineligible on ground she could choose to leave her U.S. citizen child behind in 
the United States), andOlowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding mother 
ineligible). 
33 See BenyanIin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 
F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004) . 
.. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837,844 (1984). 
35 Wes Henricksen, Abay v. Ashcroft: The Sixth Circuit's Baseless Expansion of 
INA § 101(a)(42)(a) Revealed a Gap in Asylum Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 477, 490-91 
(referring to BIA decisions In re Oluloro, In re Adeniji, and In re Dibba). 
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Holder,36 the Ninth Circuit specifically remanded the case to 
the BIA to consider whether a respondent derivatively qualifies 
based on the persecution suffered by the child. However, the 
BIA has yet to address this question. 
In their attempt to resolve the parent-child derivative 
issue, the courts of appeals have provided three methods of 
relief, none of which is specifically prescribed by statute. These 
include 1) basing the claim on the psychological harm a parent 
would suffer from witnessing her child's persecution,37 2) 
establishing relief under the theory of constructive 
deportation,3S and 3) granting eligibility based on the 
persecution a parent would directly face for attempting to 
protect her child.39 While demonstrating the courts' valiant 
efforts, these methods have unfortunately failed to put proper 
emphasis on protecting the child. 40 
A. ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT AsYLUM CLAIM: 
IMPUTING A CHILD'S FEAR TO A PARENT 
The legal strategy of imputing the child's fear of 
persecution to her parent does not establish the parent as a 
derivative asylum applicant. Rather, it provides the parent 
with an independent ground for asylum eligibility. The Sixth 
36 Benyamin, 579 F.3d 970. 
37 See Abay, 368 F.3d at 642. 
3B See, e.g., Benyamin, 579 F.3d at 974; Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701; Oforji v. 
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2003). 
39 See Abebe, 432 F .3d at 1043. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to 
the BIA and the BIA remanded the case to the Immigration Court of Portland, Oregon. 
The immigration judge held that the parent would face extreme harassment, threats, 
possible physical violence, ostracism, discrimination, and severe economic deprivation 
in preventing daughter's FGM, which provided grounds for parent's asylum claim. Id. 
See In re Anon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on file 
with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings); Abay, 368 F.3d 
at 640 (holding that ostracism may be type of persecution); Persecution of Family 
Members, Memorandum from the Office of International Affairs, Asylum Division, 
June 30, 1997, at 1 ("harm to an applicant's family member may constitute persecution 
to the applicant."); In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989) (where the BIA granted 
humanitarian asylum based in part on past harm to the applicant's father); see 
generally Kimberly Sowders Blizzard, A Parent's Predicament: Theories of Relief for 
Deportable Parents of Children U710 Face Female Genital Mutilation, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 899, 904 (2006) (discussing theories for relief for parents whose children face 
FGM). 
40 Alida Yvonne Lasker, Solomon's Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative 
Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 231, 253 (2006). 
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Circuit addressed this issue in Abay v. Ashcroft.41 There, a 
mother petitioned for asylum relief on the basis of her minor 
daughter's fear of FGM in their native country of Ethiopia.42 
The issue before the court was whether the mother could "seek 
asylum in her own right based on a fear that her child" would 
be subjected to FGM.43 The mother acknowledged that she did 
not have an express statutory right to derivative asylum based 
on her child's asylee status, but instead posited that she was 
eligible in her own right based on her fear that her daughter 
would be persecuted.44 The Sixth Circuit recognized that a 
parent is independently eligible for asylum if the parent can 
show a "well-founded fear" of the persecution of a family 
member.45 However, the Sixth Circuit declined to address 
whether parents are eligible for derivative status.46 Instead, 
the court found that a parent's fear of being unable to prevent-
as well as having to witness - her child's mutilation constituted 
persecution.47 The Abay court granted the mother asylum 
relief, hol!iing that the type of psychological persecution she 
feared was legitimate and made asylum relief appropriate.48 
It has been argued that Abay resolves the child-parent 
derivative asylum issue and should be adopted by other circuits 
and the BIA.49 However, the circuits remain divided on what 
constitutes persecution. Thus, the Abay decision does not 
guarantee that in every instance of child asylum eligibility, the 
child's parent will be granted asylum relief.50 
41 Abay, 368 F.3d at 642. 
42 Id. at 640-41. 
43 Id 
44 Id 
45 Id at 642. 
46 Id. at 641. 
47 Id. at 642. 
48 Id at 641-42. 
49 See Marcelle Rice, Protecting Parents: ~y Mothers and Fathers ~o Oppose 
Female Genital Cutting QuaJifjr for Asylum, Immigration Briefings (Nov. 2004). 
50 See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 171 (Paul T. 
Lufkin ed., Refugee Law Center 1999) (quoting United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status §51 
(1988». Compare Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (defining persecution 
as the "infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ ... in a way regarded as 
offensive"), with Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d, 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2006). See also Alida Yvonne 
Lasker, Solomon's Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative Asylum to Parents, 32 
BROOK. J. lNT'L. L. 231, 253 (2006) (" Abay theory fails to put proper emphasis on the 
child, and as a result, may fail to protect the child."). 
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Other circuits are unlikely to follow the reasoning set out 
in Abay because their definitions of persecution do not extend 
to mental or psychological harm. 51 In addition, the Abay 
analysis fails to properly consider the best interests of the 
child. Under the Abayapproach, if a parent cannot show that 
the mental harm she would suffer amounts to persecution, the 
parent still must decide whether to abandon her child or take 
her to a country in which the child would be subject to 
persecution. 52 Although an asylum application is generally 
based on the individual applicant, the unique parent-child 
relationship means that a decision not to provide relief to the 
parent directly affects the child, who would consequently face 
de facto deportation. Therefore, it is necessary to provide relief 
to parents that also takes into account the best interest of the 
child. 
The BIA has also identified two additional considerations 
in determining whether an individual is a member of a 
particular social group: particularity and social visibility of the 
social groUp.53 In Abay, the particular social group consisted of 
mothers who are unable to prevent their daughters from being 
subjected to FGM and who thus fear experiencing their 
daughters' FGM.54 Focusing on the psychological harm to the 
parent, under Abay, a parent whose child fears persecution in 
the parent's home country may automatically meet the well-
founded fear of persecution requirement. The court in Abay 
concluded that the mother there met the definition of refugee 
based on her fear of being unable to prevent her daughter's 
subjection to FGM and her fear of experiencing the cutting of 
her daughter's genitalia. Consequently, the Abay court 
reversed the BIA's decision that the mother was ineligible for 
asylum relief. 
The primary problem with asserting an independent 
asylum claim on behalf of the parent based on future 
51 See Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
psychological harm without accompanying physical harm is not enough to establish 
persecution). 
52 Alida Yvonne Lasker, Solomon's Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative 
Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK J.lNT'L. L. 231,253 (2006). 
53 See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (BIA 2006) (explaining that a 
particular social group needs to be socially visible); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 
584 (BIA 2008) (explaining that a particular social group also needs be sufficiently 
particular). 
54 Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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psychological harm is establishing a "nexus" between the 
psychological harm and a protected groUp.55 In a child asylum 
case, particularly an FGM case, the child is generally claiming 
persecution due to her membership in a particular social 
group. 56 The immutable characteristics that define the group 
must be unchangeable or so fundamental to the individual's 
identity that she should not be forced to change.57 However, 
the group cannot be significantly defined solely by the 
persecution suffered or feared. 58 A parent claiming asylum 
based on a child's fear of persecution would have particular 
difficulty since not all circuits recognize psychological harm as 
persecution. In addition, even if the court recognizes such a 
form of persecution, the parent must establish that the 
psychological harm suffered or feared is the direct result of her 
membership in a particular social group, something that is 
exceptionally difficult given the strict restrictions on the 
definition of a "social group." 
The Sixth Circuit has specifically recognized a particular 
social group, allowing asylum protection to parents based on 
the psychological fear of the persecution of their children. 
However, parents of claimants applying for asylum outside the 
Sixth Circuit may be unable to establish an asylum claim 
independent of the persecution a child fears if they are unable 
to prove the persecution is due to one of the five protected 
t 
. 59 ca egones. 
55 Under the "nexus" requirement, an individual's fear of persecution needs to be 
reasonably related to her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42) (West 2009). 
56 See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996) (defIning the particular 
social group as "[yJoung women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of 
northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced 
by that tribe, and who oppose the practice"). 
57 See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 958 (BIA 2006); Center for Gender and 
Refugees Studies, CGRS Advice - Female Genital Cutting Asylum Cases (Oct. 2007) 
(stating that "victims of female genital cutting" is an improper way to defIne a social 
group), available at 
http://cgrs. uchastings.edu/documents/cgrs/advisoriesIFGC_cases_ CG RS_overview _advi 
ce.pdf. 
58 Center for Gender and Refugees Studies, CGRS Advice - Female Genital 
Cutting Asylum Cases (Oct. 2007) (stating that "victims of female genital cutting" is an 
improper way to defIne a social group), available at 
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B. AN ALTERNATIVE AVENUE: THE CONSTRUCTIVE 
DEPORTATION THEORY 
275 
In order to better protect the interests of children, courts of 
appeals have turned to other means of granting relief to 
parents of asylee children. 60 In Benyamin v. Holder, a father 
applied for asylum relief on the grounds that his minor 
daughter had faced past persecution in the form of FGM in 
Indonesia and that he feared his other daughter would be 
subjected to FGM should the family return to Indonesia.61 The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that the father's application for 
asylum raised a "unique concern - the effect that the BIA's 
decision to deny relief to Benyamin [would] have on his alien 
minor children.,,62 The court then held that the father's asylum 
application raised the issue of constructive deportation of his 
daughters.63 Citing the court's earlier decision in Abebe v. 
Gonzales, the court reasoned that, "[b]ecause a minor alien has 
no legal right to remain in the United States, 'deportation of 
[her] parents would result in [her] being constructively 
deported."'64 However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case 
back to the BIA to consider the daughter's persecution in its 
own right as a potential ground for granting relief to the father, 
thus declining to extend the theory of constructive 
deportation.65 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit considered the constructive 
deportation theory in addressing the problems associated with 
children returning to a country in which they fear 
persecution.66 In Oforji v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit held 
that a claim for parental asylum basing eligibility on the 
potential harm to the applicant's child is cognizable only when 
the applicant's child is subject to "constructive deportation" 
60 See Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding case to BIA 
to consider whether respondent derivatively qualifies based on the persecution suffered 
by the child). 
61 Id. at 972. 
62 Id. at 974. 
63 Id. (quoting Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part». 
64 Id. at 974. 
65 Id. at 978. 
660forji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003) (fmding constructive 
deportation theory did not support respondent's claim for withholding of removal under 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture). 
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along with the applicant.67 However, under Seventh Circuit 
precedent, a child is deemed to be "constructively deported" 
only if she has no other legal right to remain in the United 
States.68 In OfOzjl: the mother asserted relief based on the 
FGM her two U.S. citizen daughters would face should she be 
forced to relocate her family to Nigeria. 69 The Seventh Circuit, 
applying the constructive deportation doctrine, reaffirmed the 
BIA's denial of asylum relief, holding that the mother failed to 
show that the daughters would be constructively deported, 
given their legal right to remain in the United States as 
citizens. 
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the theory of 
constructive deportation in Olowo v. Ashcroft.7o In Olowo, both 
of Ms. Olowo's daughters feared FGM persecution in their 
mother's home country.71 The court noted that, not only were 
both daughters legal permanent residents of the United States, 
but so was their father. Consequently, the court recognized 
that more than just the status of the child is relevant in 
determining whether the constructive deportation theory 
applies. 72 The court held that, since there was a parent 
available to care for the daughters in the United States, and 
since the daughters themselves also had a legal right to remain 
in the country, they were under no compulsion to leave and 
would not be constructively deported. 73 
The result of the varied appellate decisions is that "[t]he 
constructive deportation doctrine thus offers very narrow 
protection to parents of alien children, applying only if the 
alien child does not have the option to stay in the United 
States.,,74 However, in the FGM context, "because an alien 
67 Id. at 615-16. 
68 Id. at 616. 
69 Id. at 612. 
70 Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2004). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. The argument could be made that the father could then petition for the 
spouse as an immediate relative, thus providing relief for the mother who would 
otherwise not have a legal right to remain in the United States. However, this 
argument fails to take into account the fact that the mother and father of the children 
never were married, which entirely eliminates that avenue of relief for the mother. 
7. Kimberly Sowders Blizzard, A Parent's Predicament: Theories of Relief for 
Deportable Parents of Children U710 Face Female Genital Mutilation, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 899, 900 (2006). 
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child facing FGM if her parents are deported would most likely 
qualify for asylum herself, it would be a rare case in which the 
constructive deportation doctrine would save a parent from the 
predicament of deserting the child or exposing her to the risk of 
FGM.,,75 The only way to get around this limitation is to have 
the parent, rather than the child, apply for asylum relief based 
on the parent's fear of the child's persecution. By adopting this 
legal strategy, the child will not have established a legal right 
to remain in the United States and the parent can thus claim 
constructive deportation of the child as a means of relief. 
However, such a complicated legal strategy is likely to be 
impractical and inaccessible for most of those who flee to the 
United States in the hope of obtaining asylum relief. 
Furthermore, since the theory of constructive deportation 
would not apply to children who can legally remain in the 
United States, yet would still result in the deportation of the 
child's parent, the theory of constructive deportation ultimately 
fails to provide adequate protection to qualifying children. 
C. ATTEMPTS To PROTECT U.S. CITIZEN AND LPR CHILDREN: 
ESTABLISHING A "WELL-FOUNDED FEAR" BASED ON 
PERSECUTION FOR PROTECTING A CHILD 
Although children who have a legal right to remain in the 
United States do not fall under the constructive deportation 
theory, the reality is that such children nevertheless face de 
facto deportation when their parents are deemed ineligible for 
asylum relief. 76 Unlike constructive deportation, de facto 
deportation is not premised on an imputed legal effect, but 
instead is based on fact and reality. Regardless of whether a 
child has a legal right to remain in the United States, when a 
parent is not granted relief and is subsequently ordered 
removed, the child will most likely accompany the parent to a 
country in which the child fears persecution. Therefore, it is 
necessary that U.S. asylum law take into account the threat de 
facto deportation poses for children, particularly U.S. citizen 
and LPR children. 
75 Id 
76 The term "constructive" refers to something that is legally imputed or has an 
effect in law though not necessarily in fact. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 138 (West 2001). 
The term "de facto" refers to something that is actual and existing in fact that has 
effect even though not formally or legally recognized. Id. at 187. 
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The Ninth Circuit in Abebe v. Gonzales recognized the 
need to protect U.S. citizen children who would be forced to 
leave the country with parents who could not qualify for 
asylum.77 In Abebe, a mother and father were claiming asylum 
based on the persecution their U.S. citizen daughter would face 
if the parents were forced to relocate their family to Ethiopia. 78 
The Ninth Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence to 
show that the threat of FGM of the daughter exceeded the 
threshold required to establish asylum eligibility.79 Therefore, 
the court remanded the case to the BIA to address whether 
parents of a U.S. citizen child who are likely to face persecution 
in the parents' home country qualify for asylum relief. 80 The 
BIA then remanded the case to the immigration judge, who 
concluded that a parent could establish a well-founded fear of 
persecution based on the harm she could suffer from 
attempting to protect her U.S. citizen child from persecution.81 
Although noting that mere discrimination is generally not 
enough,82 the immigration judge held that discrimination in 
combination with other harms may be sufficient to establish 
persecution. 83 The judge found that the child's parents would 
face extreme harassment, threats, possible physical violence, 
ostracism, discrimination, and severe economic deprivation 
77 Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Ninth 
Circuit remanded the case back to the BIA, which remanded to the Immigration Court 
of Portland, Or.). The facts and holding pertaining to the extent of persecution the 
parent would face in attempting to protect the child from persecution were provided in 
the unpublished decision of the immigration judge. In reAnon (A# redacted) (Portland, 
Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with the Center for Gender & Refugee 
Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings). 
78 Abebe, 432 F.3d at 1043. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 In re Anon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on 
file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings) (addressing 
issue of whether a parent of a U.S. citizen child likely to face persecution in the 
parent's home country is eligible for asylum that was remanded in Abebe to the BIA 
and then to the IJ). 
82 Id. (citing Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955,962 (9th Cir. 1996». 
83 In re Anon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on 
file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings) (citing 
Krotova v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding anti-Semitic 
harassment, sustained economic and social discrimination, and violence against 
Russian Jew and her family compelled finding of persecution) and Korablina v. INS, 
158 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding discrimination, harassment, and 
violence against Ukranian Jew can constitute persecution». 
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should they attempt to prevent their daughter from undergoing 
FGM.84 The judge also found that the child's parents had 
established the existence of a practice of persecution in 
Ethiopia against families who would not allow their daughters 
to undergo FGM.85 
Although the decision in Abebe attempts to provide 
practical protection to U.S. citizen and LPR children who would 
face persecution in their parents' home country, the analysis is 
inconsistent with that of other the circuits and thus does not 
provide practical protection to all children. In addition, the 
decision in Abebe highlights the inherent limitation of the 
remedy, since the court focuses primarily on the parent 
neglecting to take into account the harms that the child would 
face, given the unique circumstances of the parent-child 
relationship. Furthermore, although the decision in Abebe 
provides relief, it is extremely limited because it is binding law 
only within the Ninth Circuit. 
As illustrated by Abay, Benyamin, and Abebe, there are 
serious pitfalls in a system that attempts to resolve the child-
parent asylum issue entirely through adjudicative 
interpretation of current asylum law. It is unclear whether the 
Supreme Court will ever intervene to resolve the conflicts 
associated with the child-parent derivative asylum issue. 
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court does weigh in, it is not 
apparent that any resolution under the current statutes could 
provide comprehensive protection for refugee children. As a 
result, it is necessary to look to legislative changes in order to 
provide for the practical protection of children who would suffer 
persecution should their parents not be granted asylum relief. 
III. POLICY CONCERNS FAVORING LEGISLATIVE CHANGE: 
FAMILY UNITY AND PROVIDING PRACTICAL PROTECTION FOR 
CHILD REFUGEES 
To inform the discussion of legislative change to existing 
asylum law, it is first necessary to examine the policy concerns 
that favor a legislative resolution. Current U.S. immigration 
law regarding the child-parent derivative issue runs contrary 
84 In reAnon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19,2007) (on 
file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings). 
85 I d. 
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to the principles of family unity and the protection of child 
refugees. When a child remains in the United States without 
her parents or accompanies her parents outside the United 
States, the child is not being protected. 
A. FAMILY UNITY 
The parent's option of leaving a child behind in the United 
States unaccompanied runs contrary to the goals of 
immigration law and conflicts with a body of constitutional and 
international human-rights laws aimed at protecting family 
unity.86 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court emphasized 
the importance of family and the significance of keeping 
families together.87 Current immigration law regarding the 
child-parent derivative asylum runs contrary to such 
principles. A child who is granted asylum or who is a U.S. 
citizen or LPR is forced to remain separated from her parent if 
she wishes to stay in the United States and receive the benefits 
associated with her legal status.88 
Although the word "family" is not specifically mentioned in 
the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized the implicit value of family integrity 
and extended a variety of powerful protections to the parent-
child relationship.89 In doing so, the Court has stressed 
86 One of immigration law's principal aims is to reunite families. This is clearly 
illustrated by the availability of waivers of inadmissibility for "humanitarian purposes, 
to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest." 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1255(h)(2)(B) (West 2009); see also The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 
16(3) (1948), available at http://www.un.org/enldocuments/udhr ("The family is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the State."). 
87 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
88 Should an asylee child leave, going back to the home country with her parent 
could result in rescission of the child's asylum status because it would provide evidence 
that the child was not "unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection 
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution ... " 8 
U.S.CA § 1l01(a)(42)(A) (West 2009). 
89 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("Our decisions 
establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the 
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is 
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished 
values, moral and cultural."). The Supreme Court has also recognized among the 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is the right of parents 
to "establish a home and bring up children, [a right] essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
18
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parents' essential role in raising their children.90 This includes 
deciding where a child is domiciled, which is generally linked to 
the domicile of the child's parents.91 By placing primary 
responsibility on the parent, the Court has strictly limited the 
state's role in the family unit. 92 However, when it comes to 
immigration law, the government plays a much more direct 
role in deciding where a child and parent should live, making 
the child's interest in an immigration context "much less 
prominent."93 
The direct role taken by the government in immigration 
cases is illustrated in cases concerning child-parent derivative 
asylum. By either granting or denying relief to the parent on 
the basis of her child's fear of persecution, the courts ultimately 
decide where the child will be domiciled. A parent who is not 
granted asylum relief predicated on her child's fear of 
persecution will either leave her child behind in the United 
States or return her child to a country in which the child fears 
persecution. 
In the event a child who would otherwise face persecution 
in her parent's home country remains behind in the United 
States, conflicts with the principle of family integrity arise.94 A 
child has no right to confer legal status on her parent for 
immigration purposes. 95 The parent must either leave the 
United States or remain an undocumented immigrant, a 
decision that has harsh ramifications. 96 This is a surprising 
result, given that two high-priority important policy concerns 
90 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that it is "cardinal . 
. . that the custody, care and nurture ofthe child reside fIrst in the parents"). 
91 Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. HolyfIeld, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) 
("Since most minors are legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to establish a 
domicile, their domicile is determined by that of their parents."). 
92 See Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 688 (2001) (speaking to the parameters set up by the 
United States Constitution to limit the states' ability to defme and regulate family 
rights and obligations). 
93 David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child 
Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1179 (2006). 
94 [d. 
95 In order to confer status an individual must be an LPR or U.S. citizen and 
must be over the age of twenty-one. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b)(1)(E)(2)(A)(i) (West 2009) 
(dealing with immediate relatives); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West 2009) (dealing 
with the four family-sponsored immigration preference categories). 
96 8 U.S.C.A. §1182(a) (West 2009) (excludable aliens); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(a) 
(West 2009) (removal proceedings). 
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of U.S. immigration law are family unity and the protection of 
refugees.97 
B. PRACTICAL PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN 
Current immigration law not only raises policy concerns 
about family unity, it also makes it difficult to provide practical 
protection to an asylee, LPR, or U.S. citizen child. Policy issues 
associated with providing meaningful protection to children 
encompass general concerns about unaccompanied minors 
living alone in the United States, a child's subjection to 
persecution in her parents' home country, and the 
psychological effects on a child of either remaining in the 
United States or moving to her parents' home country. 
Should a parent be denied asylum relief, resulting in a 
child remaining alone in the United States, obvious policy 
concerns arise. 98 There is a wealth of scholarship regarding 
unaccompanied minors that provides insight into the shortfalls 
of this aspect of our immigration system.99 Reports of children 
who remain behind in the United States without their parents 
have shown that such circumstances lead to severe mental 
trauma, negative changes in school performance, behavioral 
problems, and feelings of abandonment and resentment 
suffered by the children. 100 Children who remain 
unaccompanied are likely to lack the emotional, financial and 
psychological support needed to maintain stability and succeed 
in life. lol 
97 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); see also OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER OF REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND 
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 43 (1992). 
98 See generally Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, Seeking Asylum Alone: 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children and Refugee Protection in the u.s., THE 
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF CmLDHOOD AND YOUTH, VOL. 1, NO.1, 126-38 (2008). 
99 See Jacqueline Bhabha, More Than Their Share of Sorrows: International 
Migration Law and the Rights of Children, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 253 (2003); 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Unaccompanied RefUgee Minors: The Role and Place of 
International Law in the Pursuit of Durable Solutions, 3 INT'L J. CmLD. RTS. 405, 410 
(1995); Ja:cqueline Bhabha & Wendy A. Young, Through a Child's Eyes: Protecting the 
Most Vulnerable Asylum Seekers, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 757, 760 (1998). 
100 See Nina Bernstein, A Mother Deported and a Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 24, 2004, at Al (describing the accounts of several children who remained in the 
United States after one or both of their parents were deported). 
101 See Jacqueline Hagan, U.S. Deportation Policy, Family Separation, and 
Circular Migration, 42 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 64 (2008) (providing a look into the 
difficulties faced by families separated by removal). 
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Furthermore, children who remain in the United States 
without their parents and without alternative means of 
support are immediately forced to tum to the government for 
aid. 102 Separating the child and parent thus shifts the burden 
of custody to the relevant state's foster-care system and 
"ultimately onto the shoulders of American taxpayers.,,103 This 
outcome "runs counter to international and domestic child 
welfare principles regarding best interests of the child.,,104 
In addition, studies have shown that children in the foster-
care system are susceptible to emotional and behavioral 
disturbances as well as developmental and mental-health 
problems. 105 Children separated from their parents when 
relocating to the United States are more prone to experience 
difficulty in school and are more likely to be behind other 
children their age in their educational development.l06 A child's 
separation from her parents can also lead to negative 
psychological effects for both the child and parent, with long-
term separation commonly leading to severe depression and 
. t 107 anxle y. 
A parent who decides to remain in the United States with 
her child but without valid immigration status becomes an 
undocumented alien. lOS She would not be able to avail herself of 
102 Center for Gender and Refugees Studies, CGRS Advice - Female Genital 
Cutting Asylum Cases (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://cgrs. uchastings.edu/documents/cgrs/advisories/FGC _cases_ CGRS_overview _advi 
ce.pdf. 
103 I d. 
104 I d. 
105 See June M. Clausen, Ph.D., John Landsverk, Ph.D., William Ganger, M.A., 
David Chadwick, M.D., & Alan Litrownik, Ph.D., Mental Health Problems of Children 
in Foster Care, JOURNAL OF CmLD AND FAMILY STUDIES, VOL. 7, NO.3, 283-296 (Human 
Sciences Press 1998); Hewitt B. Clark, Ph.D., Barbara Lee, Ph.D., Mark E. Prange, 
Ph.D., & Beth A. McDonald, M.A., Children Lost Within the Foster Care System: Can 
Wraparound Service Strategies Improve Placement Outcomes?, JOURNAL OF CmLD AND 
FAMILY STUDIES, VOL. 5, NO.1, 39-54 (Human Sciences Press 1996). 
106 T.H. Gindling & Susan Poggio, Family Separation and the Educational 
Success of Immigrant Children, Univ. of Md., Co. of Baltimore Brief No. 7 (Mar. 2009). 
107 I d. 
108 If the parent has applied for asylum and been denied, she will automatically 
be placed in removal proceedings. During removal proceedings she can reassert her 
asylum claim. The issue of remaining undocumented arises when a parent has not 
applied independently for asylum relief and been denied because, if she had applied, 
she would be ordered removed from the United States. There are harsh ramifications 
for individuals who remain undocumented in the United States, given the negative 
sentiment toward undocumented aliens. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(c)(3) (West 2009). 
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the benefits associated with residing in the United States 
legally and she would live in fear of being arrested and forced 
to leave. lo9 Should the parent remain in the United States 
undocumented for more than one year, the parent would be 
subject to a ten-year bar from re-entering the country. no The 
parent would run the risk of being apprehended by 
Immigration Customs Enforcement and ordered removed from 
the United States.lll Such risks result in extreme hardships to 
the child forced either to flee with her parent or to remain 
alone in the United States.ll2 
In the alternative, in order to maintain family integrity, a 
parent not eligible for asylum relief based on her child's fear of 
persecution may choose to have the child accompany her back 
to their home country. Although this would guarantee family 
unity, it would subject the child to the very persecution that 
established her as a refugee in the first place. In the case of a 
country of origin that forces children to be subject to FGM, by 
taking the child to the parent's home country, the parent would 
subject the child to the threat of a practice recognized in the 
United States as a crime, persecution, and torture. 113 Some 
courts have even gone as far as to say that a parent who takes 
a child back to such a home country may be putting her legal 
custody of the child in jeopardy by endangering the child. 114 Yet 
it is hardly reasonable to expect that a family will voluntarily 
choose to break up the family unit and leave their asylee, U.S. 
citizen, or LPR child outside the intimately protected circle of 
her immediate relatives, even in order to protect the child from 
possible persecution. Nor is it necessarily desirable from a 
public policy standpoint to insist that families do so in order to 
protect their children from persecution, when research shows 
109 Id. 
110 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (West 2009). Should the parent remain in the 
United States with her child for more than 180 days, the parent would be subject to a 
three-year bar from entering the United States in the event she leaves the country and 
attempts to return. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(l) (West 2009). 
III 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) (West 2009) (inadmissible and thus removable for 
not being in possession of a valid entry document). 
112 In removal proceedings the child could attempt to receive relief under 
Cancellation "B" for non-LPRs ordered removed; however the standard of hardship is 
exceptional-extremely unusual hardship-which is a very high standard to meet. See 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b) (West 2009). 
113 See In reKasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996). 
114 See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 702-04 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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that separation from primary caregivers is not in the best 
interests of children. U5 
Forcing a U.S. citizen or LPR child to relocate with her 
parents amounts to a violation of the child's constitutionally 
protected right to live in the United States.U6 The argument 
has been made that a child who leaves for her parents' home 
country can then make the choice to return to the United 
States once she is older and thus not barred from enforcing a 
protected right. 1l7 However, a child who leaves with her parent 
to live in the parent's home country loses the benefits 
associated with her legal status for the period of time during 
which she lives outside the United States. us When the child is 
an LPR, extensive periods outside the United States can 
eventually lead to the presumption of abandonment of legal 
resident status.U9 
There are a variety of significant policy concerns directly 
relevant to the parent-child derivative asylum issue. Children 
who fear persecution in their home countries should be given 
the right to confer legal status onto their parents. Such a right 
would resolve the policy concerns of family unity and child 
protection. Since both of these concerns are fundamental to the 
life and future of the child, legislative attention to this issue is 
both necessary and urgent. 
115 See generally Nina Bernstein, A Mother Deported and a Child Left Behind, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at Al (describing the accounts of several children who 
remained in the United States after one or both of their parents were deported); June 
M. Clausen, Ph.D., John Landsverk, Ph.D., William Ganger, M.A., David Chadwick, 
M.D., & Alan Litrownik, Ph.D., Mental Health Problems of Children in Foster Care, 
JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY STUDIES, VOL. 7, NO.3, 283-96 (Human Sciences Press 
1998); Hewitt B. Clark, Ph.D., Barbara Lee, Ph.D., Mark E. Prange, Ph.D., & Beth A. 
McDonald, M.A., Children Lost Within the Foster Care System: Can Wraparound 
Service Strategies Improve Placement Outcomes?, JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY 
STUDIES, VOL. 5, NO.1, 39-54 (Human Sciences Press 1996); T.H. Gindling & Susan 
Poggio, Family Separation and the Educational Success of Immigrant Children, Univ. 
of Md., Co. of Baltimore Brief No. 7 (Mar. 2009). 
116 See Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977). 
117 See Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 1982), cert. denied, 
460 U.S. 1037 (1983) (noting that when a child objects to removal, the child's 
constitutional right to remain in the country does not prevent the child's removal to a 
foreign country by his custodial parent). 
liB See generally Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children 
of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 41 (1988). 
119 A person might be found to have abandoned her status if she stays outside the 
United States for more than 365 days without getting a re-entry permit before leaving. 
See U.S. Dept. of State, Returning Resident Alien, 
http://travel.state.govlvisa/immigrantS/info/info_1333.html (last visited Mar. 17,2010). 
23
Melo: Protecting Persecuted Children
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010
286 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
IV. NECESSARY CHANGE FOR CHILDREN: PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION AND BIA ACTION 
Given the policy concerns associated with parental 
derivative asylum and the inconsistency at the adjudicative 
level in allowing for asylum for parents of children who fear 
persecution, change is necessary in order to protect children. 
Change must come from both the legislature and the BIA in 
order to provide practical protection to asylee, U.S. citizen, and 
LPR children who fear persecution in their home countries. 
Otherwise, these children will continue to be subjected to de 
facto deportation and either separation from their parents or 
the persecution that awaits them back home. 
A. A NARROW SOLUTION: AMENDING THE DERIVATIVE 
STATUTE 
One way to address the policy concerns associated with the 
parental derivative asylum issue is for Congress to amend 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) to include parents as derivatives of a child's 
asylum application. 120 Such an amendment should establish a 
derivative asylum right for parents of asylee children under the 
age of twenty-one. The language of § 1158(b)(3)(A) should be 
amended as follows: 
A spouse, child (as defined in section llOl(b)(l) (A), (B), (C), 
(D), or (E) of this title), or parent of an alien who is granted 
asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible 
for asylum under this section, be granted the same status as 
the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien. 
There will likely be criticisms of any such proposal to grant 
derivative asylum to parents. l2l The fear of allowing a child to 
confer legal status to her parents arises from worries about 
increases in frivolous asylum claims. 122 In addition, it may be 
argued that an unscrupulous parent might take advantage of 
120 8 U.S.C.A. §1158(b)(3) (West 2009). 
121 See generally The Federation for American Immigration Reform, Anchor 
Babies: Part of the Immigration-Related American Lexicon, 
http://www.fairus.orglsitelPageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters4608 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2010). 
122 Id 
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her child's asylum claim for personal benefit.123 Concededly, 
this could be the case when a parent does not have a genuine 
relationship with her child. Thus the parental derivative 
asylum statute should be supplemented to include language 
reqUInng the existence of a genuine parent-child 
relationship.124 The proposed statutory language to supplement 
§ 1158(b)(3) should read as follows: 
A parent must show a bona fide parent-child relationship 
with the child in order to qualify as a derivative asylee under 
§ 1158(b)(3).125 
Granting derivative asylum to parents will assure the 
protection of refugee children. Such a statutory change is 
feasible in the context of the very narrow slice of cases that 
would actually fall under the parent-derivative statute. In 
2008, of the 12,187 affirmative asylum grants, only 1,505 were 
made to children under the age of seventeen.126 This amounts 
to approximately twelve percent of the total affirmative asylum 
grants.127 Of that twelve percent, it is highly unlikely that a110f 
the children granted asylum had parents who wanted, but were 
not eligible for, asylum relief. Therefore, it is doubtful that 
providing derivative claims for parents will result in abuse or 
outrageously high numbers of asylum claims on the basis of 
parent-derivative eligibility. 
123 Id 
124 In the context of deriving status from a spouse, Congress responded to 
concerns about whether the relationship was genuine and not merely for immigration 
benefits by enacting legislation that deters individuals from filing claims based on a 
fraudulent marriage. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a (West 2009). 
125 Current law already defines a "bona fide parent-child relationship" as follows: 
The terms 'parent', 'father', or 'mother' mean a parent, father, or mother only 
where the relationship exists by reason of any of the circumstances set forth in 
subdivision (1) of this subsection, except that, for purposes of paragraph (1)(F) 
(other than the second proviso therein) in the case of a child born out of wedlock 
described in paragraph (1)(D) (and not described in paragraph (1)(C», the term 
'parent' does not include the natural father of the child if the father has 
disappeared or abandoned or deserted the child or if the father has in writing 
irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption. 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(b)(2) (West 2009). 
126 Daniel C. Martin & Michael Hoefer, Department of Homeland Security, Office 
of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report, Refugees and Asylees: 2008 (June 
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Statutory change of current U.S. immigration law is also 
supported by expressed international views regarding parent 
derivative asylum. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the international authority on matters of 
refugee law, expressed its position on derivative asylum claims 
by stating that "family members/dependants of a recognized 
refugee may apply for derivative refugee status in accordance 
with their right to family unity."128 Unlike the United States, 
the UNHCR considers spouses, unmarried children under the 
age of eighteen, parents or primary caregivers of a principal 
applicant who is under the age of eighteen, and minor siblings 
of a principal applicant who is under the age of eighteen, as all 
being eligible for derivative status.129 Since one of the aims of 
U.S. refugee and asylum law is to comply with international 
law,130 it appears contradictory that Congress would not include 
parents of child applicants as derivatives of their children in 
matters of asylum since the UNHCR has explicitly recognized 
such a right under international law. Congress should adopt 
statutory language providing parents with derivative asylum 
relief to bring the United States into conformity with 
international law. 
Although providing parents with derivative asylum 
eligibility is arguably the most politically feasible option due to 
its very narrow application, such a resolution ultimately fails 
to provide comprehensive protection to all those vulnerable 
children who fear persecution in a country abroad. The 
proposed narrow revision to the current derivative asylum 
statute would fail to provide protection to U.S. citizen or LPR 
children who fear persecution in their parents' home countries, 
as these children are not in asylum proceedings and 
128 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Procedural Standards for Refugee 
Status Determination Under UNHCR's Mandate (Nov. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.unhcr.orglrefworldldocidl42d66dd84.html. Material in the Handbook is not 
controlling but is nevertheless useful to the extent that it provides one internationally 
recognized interpretation of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. In re Acosta, 191. & N. Dec. 211, 221 (1985). 
129 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Procedural Standards for Refugee 
Status Determination Under UNHCR's Mandate (Nov. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.unhcr.orglrefworldldocidl42d66dd84.html. 
130 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987) ("Not only did Congress 
adopt the Protocol's standard in the statute, but there were also many statements 
indicating Congress' intent that the new statutory definition of 'refugee' be interpreted 
in conformance with the Protocol's definition."). 
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consequently could not by extension confer legal status upon 
their parents. Yet these children would still face de facto 
deportation should their parents not be eligible for independent 
asylum relief based on the children's fear of persecution in the 
parents' home countries. 
Accordingly, one avenue of relief for U.S. citizen and LPR 
children is the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Abebe, 
which provided relief to a U.S. citizen child's parent by focusing 
on the parent's fear of the persecution she would face for 
attempting to protect her child. 131 However, the Ninth Circuit's 
and immigration judge's decisions in Abebe are neither binding 
on, nor consistent with, the decisions in other circuits or by the 
BIA. Furthermore, a U.S. citizen child could not rely on the 
constructive deportation theory to provide asylum relief for her 
parent. 132 Established legal precedent provides that children 
face constructive deportation only when they have no legal 
right to remain in the United States upon their parents' denial 
of asylum relief.133 Because a U.S. citizen or LPR child would 
still retain the legal right to remain in the United States, the 
family could not obtain asylum relief for the parents under the 
constructive deportation theory. 
B. A COMPREHENSIVE FIX: THE BIA MUST PROTECT U.S. 
CITIZEN AND LPR CHILDREN 
Policy concerns associated with derivative asylum are not 
fully served merely by adding parents to the list of eligible 
derivatives under § 1158(b)(3).134 Whether a child is an asylee, 
U.S. citizen, or LPR, if the parent is forced to leave the country, 
the child will almost certainly be forced to leave with her. 
Therefore, it is essential for the BIA to act to protect all minor 
children from being forced to relocate to countries in which 
they will live in fear persecution. 
In order to prevent the de facto deportation of U.S. citizen 
and LPR children who fear persecution in their parents' home 
131 Abebe v. Gonzalez, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); In re Anon (A# 
redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with the Center for 
Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings). 
132 See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2004); Oforji v. Ashcroft, 
354 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 2003). 
133 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701; Ofozji, 354 F.3d at 615. 
134 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3) (West 2009). 
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countries, the BIA should issue a memorandum addressing the 
necessary standards for granting relief to parents of U.S. 
citizen and LPR children. For guidance in issuing this 
memorandum, the BIA should turn to the decisions in Abay 
and Abebe to develop the criteria outlining what a parent must 
show to establish an independent asylum claim premised on 
her child's fear of persecution. 135 The BIA should allow a 
parent to establish an independent claim for asylum relief 
based on a child's fear of persecution in either of two ways: (1) 
if the parent shows she would likely suffer physical harm from 
attempting to protect her child from persecution, or (2) if the 
parent shows she would likely suffer psychological harm by 
being forced to witness the mutilation or persecution of her 
child. 
An individualized assessment based on the proposed 
revised BIA standards for parents of U.S. citizen and LPR 
children is consistent with immigration proceedings as they 
currently operate. By issuing such a memorandum, the BIA 
would provide clarity to the courts and alleviate the concerns 
associated with U.S. citizen and LPR children who fear 
persecution in their parents' home countries. 13G Although 
Abebe already speaks to such relief for U.S. citizen and LPR 
children, the holding is limited to only one circuit. 
Furthermore, the circuits remain inconsistent on the issue of 
asylum relief for parents based on their children's fear of 
persecution, with some providing various levels of protection, 
and some providing none at all. Since the BIA has yet to 
address the impact of de facto deportation on U.S. citizen and 
LPR children, and in light of the potentially dangerous 
consequences such children face, it is urgent that the BIA 
swiftly issue a memorandum covering all immigration cases 
nationwide. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of protecting refugee children is not being served 
135 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Abay v. Gonzales, 
432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Anon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration 
Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of 
Cal., Hastings). 
136 The concerns here referred to are those of family unity and protection of the 
child, which were addressed in Part II of this Comment. 
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by current U.S. immigration law concerning asylum relief. A 
child who fears mutilation and other forms of persecution in 
her home country is currently subject to de facto deportation in 
the event that her parent cannot establish an independent 
asylum claim. As a result, parents are being forced to choose 
between leaving their children behind in the United States and 
taking their children to places where persecution awaits. 
Given this stark reality, changes to current U.S. asylum 
law are both urgent and necessary. First, in order to ensure 
practical protection for asylee children, Congress should amend 
the derivative statute to include parents as derivative asylees. 
Such a statutory change will immediately provide practical 
protection to asylee children. Second, the BIA should issue a 
memorandum that addresses the concerns associated with U.S. 
citizen and LPR children who fear persecution in their parents' 
home countries. The memorandum should state that a parent 
can establish an independent right to asylum based on either 
the psychological harm she would likely face by witnessing her 
child's persecution or the physical harm she would likely suffer 
by attempting to protect her child from persecution. 
Enacting each of these proposals would promote long-
standing, deeply held, U.S. constitutional and public-policy 
principles favoring family unity and integrity. Both the 
language and the practical effect of U.S. asylum law must be 
fixed in order to prevent any mother from again being forced to 
make the devastating decision to take her son or daughter back 
to a place where the family will live in fear of mutilation and 
persecution. 
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